摘要
很多网站采用在英式拍卖中加入固定价格选项的方式销售多件同类商品。我们证明了,在此规则下存在一个弱占优投标策略。若顾客对商品的估价低于固定价格,那么,当拍卖价格低于他的估价时,该顾客参与拍卖,且以自己的估价作为报价是他的弱占优投标策略;否则,当拍卖价格超过他的估价时,他退出拍卖。若顾客对商品的估价高于或等于固定价格,他会在参与拍卖和接受固定价格之间进行选择;若他参与拍卖,将固定价格作为报价是他的弱占优投标策略。我们发现,该顾客是选择参与拍卖、还是选择以固定价格购买主要依赖于顾客到达拍卖时距离拍卖结束的剩余时间。最后,通过算例,我们对影响顾客参与策略的因素进行了数值分析并得到了一些结论。
English auctions with posted prices are widely used in the Internet to sell identical items.We propose a weakly dominant bidding strategy.Consumer whose valuation is lower than the posted price should participate in the auction and it is optimal to bid his true valuation.Consumer whose valuation is higher than the posted price would make a decision between participating in the auction and buying at the posted price directly.It is optimal to bid the posted price if he participates in the auction.We find that his decision on whether to participate in the auction or buy at the posted price significantly depends on the time remaining to the end of the auction.Finally,we make a numerical analysis on the impact of factors on his decision and obtain some conclusions.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期113-121,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70701028)
陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2010JQ9002)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(72105472)