控制权私利下的企业资本配置决策研究

Research on Capital Allocation Strategy of Companies Based on the Private Benefits of Controlling Shareholder

基于企业内部资本配置的理论阐释,以固定资产和长期股权的组合投资为研究对象,构建出有无大股东控制下的企业资本配置模型,理论分析控制权私有收益对企业资本配置决策的影响。研究结果表明:大股东的控制权私利行为是导致企业偏离最优资本配置决策的一个重要原因,偏离程度随现金流权与控制权分离度的增大呈非线性变化。该变化趋势主要由固定资产投资收益率和长期股权投资收益率的大小决定。

Based on the theory of internal capital allocation in companies,from the perspective of fixed asset investment and long equity investment,this paper analyzes the effect of the private benefits of controlling shareholder on the internal capital allocation strategy.The conclusions show that,the private benefit of controlling shareholder is one of the most important reasons leading to distortion and inefficiency of capital allocation,and the level of distortion is nonlinear changing with the separation-degree between ownership and control.However,tendencies of change have two situations,which are determined by the rate of return on fixed asset investment and long equity investment.