古诺纳什均衡下商品出口与绕过反倾销的FDI比较研究

A comparative study on the merchandize export with bypassing antidumping FDI under Counot-Nash Equilibrium

该文章运用微观经济学、博弈论等理论和方法探讨了在国内外企业处于完全信息且同时决策(即古诺纳什博弈)的假设条件下,面对进口国政府的反倾销国外企业对商品出口或对外直接投资决策如何抉择问题;建立了绕过反倾销的可能引起对外直接投资的最小反倾销税率模型;得出了该反倾销税率与国外企业在国内外生产产品的单位边际成本及进口国市场所用收入税率有关以及进口国政府不能确定过高的反倾销税率等结论,并以彩电行业进行案例分析。

This paper examined the contingent measures between goods export and FDI in the presence of anti- dumping under complete and static game by means of micro- economics and game theory; established the tariff-jumping minimal anti-dumping duty rate model which may cause FDI of foreign firms; concluded that the anti-dumping duty rate concerns domestic and foreign unit marginal costs and the foreign income tax rate, and domestic government cannot determine excessive high anti-dumping duty rate and so on.