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认知无线电网络频谱竞标和定价 被引量:1

Spectrum Bidding and Pricing in Cognitive Radio Networks
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摘要 为充分利用空闲的电视(TV)广播信道,给出了一个层次化频谱贸易模型,分析了TV广播机构、运营商、用户驻地设备间的交互.将多个TV广播机构和多个运营商间的频谱贸易建模为双向拍卖,给出了简单易行的算法.使用演化博弈理论描述认知用户在选择运营商时的动态行为,用中心化算法实现网络选择的演化过程;用非合作博弈描述运营商间的接入价格竞争.为追求最大化利润,运营商应合理地联合决定所需的TV信道数和业务接入价格.数值结果揭示了频谱贸易模型性能.所提的方案改善了无线频谱使用效率,提高了经济和社会效益. To improve utilization of the television (TV) bands, a hierarchical spectrum trading model is presented to analyze the interaction among TV broadcasters, wireless regional area network (WRAN) service providers, and WRAN users. In this model a double auction is established among multiple TV broadcasters and WRAN service providers. In particular, the theory of evolutionary games is used to in- vestigate the dynamics of WRAN user behavior and solution in network selection. A centralized algorithm is proposed to implement the proposed evolutionary game model for network selection. Then, multiple WRAN service providers compete with each other by adjusting the service price charged to WRAN users. To model the competition, a non-cooperative game is formulated. In order to maximize their own profits, every WRAN service provider should seek the optimal spectrum bidding and service pricing strategies. Numerical results are presented on the performance of the spectrum trading model. The proposed frame-work will improve spectrum utility efficiency, and provide large economic and societal benefits.
出处 《北京邮电大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2010年第5期136-140,共5页 Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
基金 国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2009CB320401) 新一代宽带无线移动通信网科技重大专项项目(2008ZX03003) 国家自然科学基金项目(60772108)
关键词 认知无线电网络 双向拍卖 演化博弈 复制者动态 纳什均衡 cognitive radio network double auction evolutionary game replicator dynamics Nash equilibrium
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参考文献10

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共引文献14

同被引文献13

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