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我国排放交易拍卖机制设计与实验研究 被引量:4

Design and Experimental Study of the Auction Mechanism of the Emission Trading in Chinese Market
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摘要 综合考虑我国节能减排约束性目标和环保现状,设计了一套以拍卖为核心、基本适合我国国情的总量控制型排放市场交易体系,该交易体系由排放初始分配市场、转让交易市场和回购交易市场等三大市场构成。对适用初始排放权拍卖的4种拍卖机制设计并实施了系列经济学实验。基于对该实验结果的综合统计分析和中国目前的实际情况,建议初始排放拍卖宜采用向上叫价时钟拍卖机制。 Taking comprehensive consideration of the restricted aim at saving energy and reducing pollution emission as well as the environmental situation in China,we propose a set of marketing system of emission trading,which consists of the initial market of allocation,the alienable market and the buying back market.Focusing on initial auction mechanism,we have designed four sorts of initial auction mechanisms and put them into practice by carrying out a series of economic experiments.Based on the comprehensive analyses of the experimental results and the Chinese actuality,we suggested that Ascending Clock Auction should be adopted.
出处 《华南师范大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第5期129-134,共6页 Journal of South China Normal University:Social Science Edition
基金 湖南省科技计划资助项目"总量控制型排污交易拍卖机制设计与实验研究"(2010FJ3110)
关键词 排放交易 总量控制 拍卖机制 拍卖实验 emissions trading gross control auction mechanism auction experiments
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参考文献13

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共引文献136

同被引文献29

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