摘要
本文考虑工程投资规模,将监理的能力水平、努力程度、外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素引入委托代理理论模型,通过模型分析工程监理的最优激励系数,从而增加激励效用,提高监理工作积极性,更有效地降低道德风险的发生。
Taking the scale of projects investment into account,this paper introduces the level of supervision competence,the degree of effort and their impact factors into the principal-agent theory.By analyzing the optimal project supervision incentive coefficient,the incentives are turned to be more effective,the supervisors take more initiatives and moral misconducts are reduced.
出处
《河北工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2010年第3期83-86,共4页
Journal of Hebei University of Technology：Social Sciences Edition
基金
河北省交通厅科技计划项目
关键词
工程建设监理
激励机制
委托代理
道德风险
construction supervision
incentive mechanism
principal-agent
moral misconduct
