摘要
构建了一个双源渠道的二级供应链模型,采用Stackelberg主从博弈分析了预测信息对制造商和零售商的绩效影响,比较了信息共享和信息不共享两种情况下的最优定价策略,考察了预测信息精度、渠道竞争在零售商信息分享决策中的作用。研究表明,在一定的条件范围内,零售商可以从信息分享中获利,零售商具有主动分享其私有信息的动机。
A two-level dual-channel supply chain model was established.The performance of forecast information on manufacture and retailer according to Stackelberg game was investigated.The optimal pricing strategies of two cases-information sharing case and non-information sharing case were compared.The impact of forecast information＇s accuracy and channel competition on retail＇s information-sharing decision were revealed.The results show that retailers can benefit from the information-sharing within certain conditions,retailers have the motive to share their private information.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
北大核心
2010年第5期40-43,50,共5页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家青年自然科学基金资助项目(71001081)
关键词
双渠道
信息分享
渠道竞争
供应链
dual-channel
information-sharing
channel competition
supply chain
