应用机制设计理论建立我国医院公益性保障机制模型被引量：1

Building a Model to Guarantee the Public Welfare Nature of Hospitals in China by Applying Mechanism Design Theory

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摘要针对我国目前医院公益性弱化问题,通过分析国内外研究现状及存在问题,分析应用机制设计理论对此展开深入研究的意义,和以此为平台设计符合国情的医院公益性保障机制模型的可行性,为国家建立医院公益性保障机制,制定相关政策和制度提供新思路。 The problem of weakening publicity in China reflects the lacking public welfare nature of its healthcare system.By analyzing the current situation and existing problems,the possibility of building a model is discussed to guarantee the public welfare nature of China＇s hospitals under the framework of mechanism design theory,thus a new approach for the studies of China＇s healthcare system is provided.

作者林婕陈昱方张亮

机构地区华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院汕头医学院

出处《中国卫生经济》北大核心 2010年第11期8-10,共3页 Chinese Health Economics

基金广东省自然科学基金资助项目(05008366)

关键词医院公益性机制设计理论模型设计纳什均衡激励相容 hospital＇s public welfare nature mechanism design theory model design Nash equilibrium incentive compatibility

分类号 R197.3 [医药卫生—卫生事业管理]

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