共营企业和利润最大化企业的R&D战略互动

R&D strategic interaction with the labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms

针对共营企业(LMF)和利润最大化企业(PMF)共存的寡头竞争市场,建立二阶段博弈模型,分析了两者的产量和研发(R&D)战略互动.通过建立PMF和LMF的目标函数,探讨了两者的产量和R&D反应曲线,并且对均衡产量和均衡R&D进行了比较静态分析,最后将LMF和PMF共存的双寡头市场与已有的LMF和LMF双寡头,PMF和PMF双寡头市场进行了比较.研究表明,PMF和LMF在产量和R&D投资方面存在较大的差异.在三种寡头市场中,企业之间的产量和R&D战略互动仅仅与企业类型相关,而与寡头市场类型无关;其均衡产量和均衡R&D的比较静态分析与企业类型和寡头市场类型都相关.

This paper developes a two-stage game modelfor the duopoly competition marketcoexisted by a labor-managed firm （LMF） and a profit-maximizing firm （PMF）, and analyzed their strategic interaction in output and R＆D investment. By establishing objective functions of LMF and PMF, it discusses their response curves of output and R＆D investment. Then it explores comparative static a- nalysis for equilibrium output and R＆D investment. Finally it compares the LMF-PMF duopoly with LMF-LMF duopoly and PMF-PMF duopoly. It is shown that the output and R＆D investment of LMF differ from those of PMF greatly. Among three types of duopoly, the output and R＆D investment have no relation to the type of duopoly, but are related to the type of firm only. However, comparative static analysis for equilibrium output and R＆D investment are related to both the type of firm and the type of duopoly mostly.