基于非对称信息的闭环供应链激励合同策略研究

Study on Incentive Contract Strategy for Closed-loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

在价格敏感的随机需求量和与回收努力敏感的回收量条件下,假定供、销双方销售价格和分销商回收努力程度信息不对称,建立基于销量和废品回收量的双重激励机制,给出供应商为吸引分销商选择对自己最有利的售价和努力程度而设计的最优激励合同,比较了不同信息条件下供销双方的策略。

Assuming price-sensitive stochastic demands and effort-sensitive return,the supplier’s optimal incentive contrast is present under the assumption about asymmetric information,and a double incentive mechanism is presented.The incentive contract is given and the optimal strategies are compared in different conditions.