代理问题对资本预算方法的影响——基于实验数据的实证研究

Effects of Agency Problems on Capital Budgeting Methods——An Empirical Study Based on Experimental Data

本文用实验方法研究代理问题如何影响资本预算方法的选择,根据实验数据统计分析发现,代理问题对资本预算方法的选择具有显著影响,代理问题较强时,代理人会普遍选择传统简易的净现值预算方法;代理问题较弱时,代理人才会选择既能进行项目决策又能进行业绩评价的经济增加值方法。

In the process of the enterprise investment decision, agency problems may influence the choice of capital budgeting methods. The paper studies how agency problem influences the choice of methods of capital budgeting mental method. Experimental data analysis shows that agency problems have a significant impact on the choice by expefi- of capital budgeting methods, when the agency problems was serious, the agent would choose traditional and simple net present value method universally. And when the agency problems was weak, the agent would choose economic value added method which not only could make project decision but also could do performance evaluation.