地方政企合谋与信贷资源配置

Collusion between Local Governments and Firms and Credit Resources Allocation

通过建立地方政企合谋与信贷资源配置的数理模型来研究分权下地方政府干预信贷资源配置服务于地方政府的自身效用,结果表明地方政企合谋是地方政府在直接干预力度减弱的情况下,间接干预金融资源配置的一个重要的途径;且地方政府官员的政治晋升是助长这些干预行为的关键因素。若将发现地方政企合谋与政府地方官员政治晋升与否直接相关,即能起到威慑作用,并能形成最优的防范地方政企合谋契约。

Under decentralization system, local government intervention to the credit resources is for serving their local utilities. It has been found that collusion between local governments and firms is one of the important ways of the local governments indirect intervention to the credit resources allocation when the direct intervention channel is weak. The career promotion of local government officials is the key incentive factor to intervene credit resources when establishing a mathematical model of collusion between local governments and enterprises. Evaluating the relationship between the local government and firms collusion and the local officials＇ promotion, we can achieve the optimal contract to prevent the formation of local government-enterprise collusion.