投资者监督、政府干预与企业价值——基于机构投资者的经验证据

Investor Monitoring,Government Intervention and Firm Value:Empirical Evidence Based on Institutional Investors

文章通过模型证明大投资者(Blockholders)与个人投资者相比对上市公司实施更多的监督,并且大投资者的监督行为能够增加企业价值;但模型也表明机构投资者是否实施监督及其为企业带来的价值增量取决于监督的成本和收益。文章利用中国资本市场的机构投资者数据,检验了理论模型的四个基本结论。结果表明:机构投资者比个人投资者更积极地监督上市公司,并有助于提高企业价值;政府干预(用上市公司最终控制人为政府代表)减少了机构投资者监督的收益,降低了机构投资者对企业价值所起到的正面作用,削弱了机构投资者监督的积极性。研究结论表明,发展机构投资者有助于改善上市公司的治理水平,提升企业价值;但是政府干预限制了机构投资者的积极公司治理作用。

This study develops a simple model on the monitoring behaviors of investors, and finds that blockholders play a more active monitoring role than individual investors. The model indicates that monitoring behaviors of blockholders improve the firm value. On the other hand, the model also shows that whether blockholders monitor or not and the firm value growth caused by blockholders＇ monitoring are both determined by the benefits and costs of monitoring. Using data of institutional investors＇ holdings, the paper tests these predictions. The empirical results confirm the predictions of the model： Institutional investors are more active in monitoring firms than individual investors, and these behaviors help to increase firm value; but government intervention （proxied by whether the ultimate controller is government ） decreases the benefits from institutional investors＇ monitoring. Specifically, government intervention weakens institutional investors＇ incentive to monitor and decreases the positive effect of institutional investors on firm values. Results show that developing institutional investors could improve corporate governance, but government intervention has a negative effect on the monitoring behaviors of institutional investors.