摘要
通常认为弗雷格提出的涵义与指称的二分说突破了密尔指称论中的意义即语词所指对象的局限性。实际上,作为逻辑哲学家,语义分析只是他的手段。涵义与指称的区分与弗雷格独特的本体论和认识论立场密切相关。通过《论涵义与指称》一文可以解析其本体论和认识论立场:认知对象具有抽象性和客观性;意义建构过程中人具有主体地位;语词和语句的涵义均具有主体间性;涵义是联结语言表达式与其指称的认识论通道;认识的途径和目标具有不可分割性。
It's generally believed that the distinction between sense and reference by Frege is a great improvement to Mill's theory which equals the meaning of words to the objects they denote.In fact,Frege was a philosopher proficient in logic analysis.Semantic analysis was only his means not an end.The distinction between the two terms is closely related to Frege's unique ontology and epistemology positions,which can be reflected in his writing Sense and Reference as the followings: the object has the quality of being abstract and object;humans are the controlling factor in the meaning construction;the senses of both words and sentences have intersubjectivity;sense is the access that relates an expression and its reference;the means and object of knowing can't be separated.
出处
《大连海事大学学报(社会科学版)》
2010年第5期98-101,共4页
Journal of Dalian Maritime University(Social Science Edition)
基金
北京市属高等学校人才强教资助项目(PHR20101028)
关键词
弗雷格
涵义
指称
认知
Frege
sense
reference
cognition