我国上市公司配股业绩下滑之谜：盈余管理还是掏空？

The Rights Issue Puzzle of Listed Firms in China:Earnings Management or Tunneling?

我国上市公司存在"一股独大"和"一言堂"的特征,为大股东的掏空行为创造了先天性的条件。在我国这样特殊的制度背景下,采用掏空理论比盈余管理观点更能直接解释我国上市公司配股业绩下滑之谜。实证研究结果表明,公司配股后会计业绩和真实业绩同时出现了显著下滑;配股后操纵性应计利润的反转会引起公司会计业绩出现显著的下滑,但是对公司配股后真实业绩的下滑没有显著影响;而大股东转嫁掏空成本的程度会影响公司配股后真实业绩的下滑,不过只有社会法人股性质的大股东转嫁掏空成本的程度会显著影响公司配股后真实业绩的下滑,而由于受到操纵性应计的干扰,大股东转嫁掏空成本的程度对公司配股后会计业绩下滑的直接影响要打个折扣,在统计上表现不显著。这说明,我国上市公司配股业绩的下滑,不但与盈余管理有关,而且与上市公司大股东的掏空行为有关,重要的是我国上市公司大股东的掏空行为是造成其配股后真实业绩下滑的根本之因。

The declining post-offering operating performance of rights issues in China is termed as ＂The Rights Issues Puzzle of China＂. The ＂Tunneling＂ incentive may better explain this puzzle. The empirical evidence shows that the post-offering accounting performance and real operating performance of fights issues are beth significantly declining, respectively triggered by discretionary accruals reverse and the cost of tunneling that is transferred to minor shareholders by controlling shareholders classified into state and social-corporate one, however, only significantly for the latter one.