上市银行董事会独立性、CEO薪酬与绩效——来自中国上市银行的经验证据

Board Independence of Listed Banks,CEO Compensation,and Performance——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Banks

本文通过收集2006～2009年11家上市的全国股份制商业银行的数据,实证分析了银行董事会独立性与CEO薪酬的关系,并在考虑银行CEO薪酬内生性基础上,进一步检验了银行董事会独立性、CEO薪酬和绩效的关系。研究结果显示,银行董事会规模越大、内部董事越多、CEO任期越长以及CEO兼任董事长的董事会的独立性越差,独立性较差的董事会的监督效率也较低,此时,银行CEO的薪酬更容易偏离股东利益,加大银行的代理成本。此外,研究还发现,银行CEO薪酬与银行绩效之间的敏感性不强,即银行CEO薪酬越高并不意味着银行业绩越显著。

Through the collection data that 11 listed commercial banks from 2006 to 2009, the authors empirically examine the relations between bank CEO compensation and board-of-director independence and the relationship between CEO compensation, board-of-director independence and bank performance taking into account the endogeneity of CEO compensation. The evidence suggests that board of larger board, higher proportion of inside directors in board, long-tenure CEO and CEO who also chairs the board, its independence is worse. Board independence is worse and its surveillance efficiency is also low. In this case, the bank CEO compensation is easier to deviate the shareholder benefit, enlarges agency cost in these banks. In addition, the research also finds that the bank between CEO compensation and bank performance sensitivity is not strong. That is, bank CEO compensation being higher does not mean that the bank performance is more remarkable.