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转售价格维持的违法性与法律规制 被引量:48

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摘要 尽管理论研究通常更为强调转售价格维持行为的内在合理性,但是,实证调查却表明,很多情况下转售价格维持的确提高了产品的销售价格,对消费者福利构成损害。转售价格维持的负面效果来自于两个方面:首先,从纵向关系上看,生产商通过转售价格维持抑制了品牌内竞争,从而在整体上构成对竞争的削弱。其次,从横向关系上看,经销商的共谋可以通过转售价格维持得以更好地实施。但是,转售价格维持负面作用的发挥,依赖于特定的市场结构条件。因此,反垄断法在规制转售价格维持时,不应当全面严格禁止转售价格维持,而应当构建以市场结构为标准的筛选机制来防止其负面效应。
作者 李剑 唐斐
出处 《当代法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第6期110-116,共7页 Contemporary Law Review
基金 司法部重点项目:反垄断法实施问题研究(08SFB1007)
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