国际贸易对碳减排协议的促进作用——理论框架及减排意愿的数值一般均衡情景模拟

Positive Effects of International Trade on Global Carbon Reduction Agreements:Theoretical Framework and Numerical General Equilibrium Simulation on Reduction Incentives

全球碳减排谈判是具有外部性特征的多方合作博弈。文章首先构建一个单一商品无贸易多国模型,对各国的碳减排意愿进行刻画,利用相关数据对不同情景下的各国碳减排意愿进行数值一般均衡模拟;在此基础上,将国际贸易因素引入模型,重新对各国的减排意愿进行情景模拟。数值模拟结果表明:(1)经济规模越大,全球变暖持续的时间跨度越长,温度上升带来的效用损失越大,各国单方面减排意愿越强;(2)国际贸易的存在更有利于各国碳减排意愿的提高,因为各国通过减产实现减排的同时,其贸易条件得到改善,从而将减产带来的效用损失部分转嫁到其他各国;(3)当前,假借碳减排之名而抬头的新贸易保护主义不仅无法促进各国碳减排,反而将阻碍全球碳减排协议的达成。

The global carbon reduction negotiation is a cooperative game with externality.The paper establishes a single-good non-trade multi-country model framework to depict the carbon reduction incentives.Then based on available data and literatures,it simulates reduction incentives of each country in different scenarios by using numerical general equilibrium simulation technique.It further introduces the factor of international trade into the model,and makes the corresponding reduction incentives simulations as well.The simulation results are as follows：firstly,the larger economic scale is,the longer warming period lasts,the bigger utility loss from warming is and the stronger the reduction incentives of each country are;secondly,the presence of international trade would enhance the reduction incentives of each country and make the carbon reduction agreements more likely because the output reduction has a positive term of trade effect which decreases the cost of output reduction;thirdly,the revival of new protectionism in name of carbon reduction would not promote carbon reduction,but instead prevent each country from coming to reduction agreements.