国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究——基于双重型、叠加式委托代理的视角

Corporate Governance of Overseas Firms of State-owned Multinational Corporations Based on Double and Stacking Principal-agency Frameworks

国有跨国公司境外企业股权结构的相对集中或高度集中和产权关系的延伸,使其委托代理呈现出双重型、叠加式的特征。基于此特征,文章确立了双重型、叠加式委托代理理论并作为国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究的分析框架。研究结果表明,完善国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理的前提和基础在于委托代理链能否形成有效的传导机制以及各级委托链的委托人和代理人是否明确。在公司治理结构与机制优化的基础上,文章提出应从控股股东或大股东对经营者和中小股东对其代理人两条途径同时降低公司治理成本,并通过模型对控股股东或大股东获取租金的合理界限与范围进行了界定。

Owing to the relatively or highly concentrated equity structure of overseas corporations and the further extension of ownerships relationship of state-owned multinational corporations,the overseas companies＇ principal-agency problem is featured by double and stacking types.On the basis of the characteristics,the paper builds the double and stacking principal-agency theory and applies it to analyze corporate governance of overseas firms belonging to state-owned multinational corporations.The research shows that the key premise and basis of improving corporate governance of overseas firms belonging to state-owned multinational corporations depends on the effective transmission mechanism of principal-agent chain and the definition of principals and agents at all levels.On the basis of the optimization of the structure and mechanism of corporate governance,the paper illustrates tow roads to reduce the corporate governance cost,namely form the angle of controlling or major shareholders against the managers and from the angle of the medium or small shareholders against their agents,and defines the reasonable rent quantity that the controlling or major shareholders should be given through the analysis model.