管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵

Managerial Power,Private Income and Compensation Rigging

全球金融危机爆发以来,我国国有企业高管"天价薪酬"与"零薪酬"并存的乱象,引起社会公众的广泛关注。本文针对国企高管薪酬改革的制度背景,选取2004—2007年国有上市公司为样本,研究我国国企高管是否通过其权力影响而获取私有收益,并探讨其进行薪酬操纵的行为策略和薪酬结构的价值效应。研究发现:(1)国有企业高管的权力越大,其获取的私有收益越高,但中央政府控制的国有企业高管偏好隐性的非货币性私有收益,而地方政府控制的国有企业高管更偏好显性的货币性私有收益;(2)从薪酬业绩敏感性来看,管理层权力越大,薪酬与操纵性业绩之间的敏感性越大,表明随着权力增长,管理层会倾向利用盈余操纵获取绩效薪酬;(3)通过对实际薪酬的分解,发现激励薪酬具有正面的价值效应,而操纵性薪酬具有负面的价值效应。研究还发现,拓宽高管激励渠道,转变控制策略的内部治理机制以及聘请高质量审计服务、提高机构持股比例的外部监管机制可以有效抑制国企高管的薪酬操纵行为。

Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the debate about coexistence of ＂astronomical salaries＂ and ＂zero pay＂ in China＇s state-owned enterprises has led to a wide public concern. Based on the background of state-owned enterprises reform, by selecting the data of state-owned enterprises from 2004 to 2007, this paper studies the compensation rigging behavior of top managers of the state-owned enterprises and their value effect. We find that： （ 1 ） More managerial power of top managers of state- owned enterprises leads to higher private benefits, the top managers of state-owned enterprise controlled by the central government prefer to hidden non-monetary private benefits, while the top managers controlled by local governments prefer to explicit monetary private benefits. （2） From the pay performance sensitivity point of view, the greater power of top managers, the higher sensitivity between pay and rigging performance. This indicates that top managers with stronger power tend to use earning rigging to entrench performance compensation. （3） Through the decomposition of the actual salary, we find that incentive compensation has significant positive value effect, but rigging compensation has significant negative value effect. Finally, this paper also examines the role of internal and external of governance mechanisms, we find the compensation rigging problem could be suppressed by multi-incentive channel, matrix control strategy, higher quality audit service and higher institutional investor ownership.