股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理

CEO Stock Incentives,Earnings Management and Corporate Governance

产权多元化、股权激励和公司治理是考察我国国有企业改革成效的一个重要课题。本文根据我国资本市场独特的制度变化,从盈余管理的角度对股权激励的公司治理效应进行研究并发现:股权分置改革后尚未提出股权激励的上市公司,其CEO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈显著的负相关关系,而提出或通过激励预案的公司,其CEO股权和期权报酬与盈余管理的负相关关系大幅减弱并不再统计显著,盈余管理加大了CEO行权的概率,而且CEO行权后公司业绩大幅下降。本文的研究结果表明,正式的股权激励具有负面的公司治理效应,只有继续深化国有企业改革并加快现代公司制度建设,才能强化CEO与股东之间有效的制衡和监督机制,切实改善公司治理。

To assess the state enterprise reform in China, it is important to examine the relationship among ownership structure, CEO stock incentives and corporate governance. From the perspective of earnings management, this paper analyzes the corporate governance effect of CEO stock incentives after the reform of non-tradable shares. The paper finds that CEO stock incentives, as measured by the percentage of shares and options in total CEO compensations, are negatively related to earnings management for publicly listed finns which have not declare CEO stock incentive plans. This negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant for firms which have either formally announced or approved CEO stock incentives plans. In addition, there is strung evidence that earnings management is positively related to the probability of stock options exercises by the CEOs. Moreover, industry-adjusted ROA significantly declines after a CEO exercises his stock options. The findings of this paper indicate that CEO stock incentives have negative effect on corporate governance. Therefore, to strengthen the effectiveness of corporate governance, the Chinese government should continue to deepen state enterprise reforms and foster a more vibrant modern enterprise system.