真值条件意义理论中的真概念

The Conception of Truth in Truth-conditional Theory of Meaning

正统观点认为,收缩论真概念与真值条件意义理论是不相容的。本文首先从若干方面考察不相容性论点,然后回顾戴维森意义理论中的真概念,最后指出,一种修正的扩展的消引号真概念与基于彻底解释框架的戴维森式真值条件意义理论是可以结合的,从而反驳了正统观点。

There has been an orthodox view that deflationism about truth is incompatible with the truth-conditional theory of meaning.I explore the incompatibility thesis from several aspects in the first place,and then review the notions of truth appeared in Davidson＇s theory of meaning,finally,I argue that a revised extended disquotational notion of truth can successfully be combined with a Davidsonian truth-conditional theory of meaning built on the framework of radical interpretation,hence the orthodox view is rejected.