基于博弈论视角的三门湾渔业资源管理研究

A Study on Fishery Resources Management in the Sanmen Bay Based on Game Theory

目前,国内跨行政区的海域内渔业资源管理机制问题凸显,渔业资源管理成效落后于资源保护的现实需求,这与地方政府对渔业的重视程度及决策时的利益取舍有关。文章以地方政府需要权衡全局而作出决策为立足点,以沿岸流经三个县级行政区域的三门湾为研究区域,以海域内鳗苗渔业资源管理为研究对象,从博弈论角度分析了地方政府之间决策以及地方政府和渔民之间博弈的内在经济学关系。运用成本—收益分析法,引入机会成本等参数,构建了博弈模型,计算并分析了政府强监管均衡概率和渔民违法均衡概率及其影响因素,提出相应建议。结果显示,外部性、资源收益及机会成本等是影响地方政府决策的重要因素,在短期利益的追逐下,地方政府会倾向选择弱监管措施。分析认为,短视性和外部性是制约地方政府采取渔业资源保护措施的主要因素,也是目前渔民违法违规均衡概率偏高的原因。提出解决问题的关键在于,将地方政府管理渔业资源的外部性内部化,提高地方政府的渔业资源收益。创新资源管理模式和渔业资源利用方式,完善政府业绩考核机制等。

There are a series of problems associated with mechanisms of fishery resources management in the marine space which is a cross-administrative region in China.Fishery laws enforcement seems to be not able to keep pace with current need for fishery resources protection. This is due in large part to the importance of the fishery industry to local government and the priority of fishery benefits protection in policy-making processes.To make effort to address these problems,a study on fishery resources management at the Sanmen Bay encompassing three counties in Zhejiang Province is present.A global trade-off strategy of the local government was incorporated in this study.On the basis of investigating current fishery resource management situations,the authors analyzed the internal economic relationships when local government and fisherfolk are making decisions.By introducing variables such as fine for fisherfolk＇s illegal action and opportunity cost for fishery resource protection conducted by local government,a game model based on a cast-benefit method was established.Balanced probabilities of fisherfolk＇s illegal action as well as local government＇s strong management were estimated and analyzed from survey data. Subsequently,some suggestions were given.Survey data was made use of to deal with the variables involved in mathematical functions in a quantitative manner.In addition,some statistical manipulation was performed on the average values.Results indicated that externality,resource earnings,and opportunity cost were generally regarded as the most important factors restraining management decision-making for local government.For purposes of pursuing short-term interests, the local government would tend to take relatively weak regulation measures to manage fishery resources.It was concluded that externality of management and the local government＇s shortsighted view were two major constraints.Both externality and shortsighted action of the local government in a weak management would be detrimental to fishery resources,showing a high balanced probability of fisherfolk＇s illegal behavior.It was suggested that addressing such problems lie in increasing fishery resource earnings after local government takes protective measures.Interiorization of the externality of the fishery resource management action of the local government could also be accounted for.