现金流权视角下大股东侵占对上市企业资本配置决策的影响研究

Effects of Large Shareholders' Expropriation on Capital Allocation Strategy of Listed Companies based on the Cash Flow Rights

基于企业资本配置的理论阐释,以无风险资产与风险性资产投资为研究对象,将大股东侵占因素内生到企业价值期权模型之中,数值分析大股东的侵占行为对企业资本配置决策和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明:(1)大股东的侵占行为是导致上市企业资本配置行为扭曲、资本配置非效率的一个重要原因;(2)大股东的侵占行为导致上市企业对风险性资产投资的非效率"挤占";(3)大股东的侵占水平与无风险资产的配置比例正相关,与风险性资本的配置比例负相关;(4)大股东的侵占水平与企业价值负相关,现金流权比例的增大降低了大股东的侵占水平,提升了企业价值。

Based on the theory of capital allocation in companies,from the perspective of risky assets and safe assets investment this paper incorporates the factor of large shareholders＇ expropriation into real option model to analyze numerically the effect of the large shareholders＇ expropriation on the capital allocation strategy and firm valuations.The conclusions show that：（1） large shareholder＇s expropriation is one of the most important reasons leading to distortion and inefficiency of capital allocation;（2） large shareholder＇s expropriation leads to listed companies inefficiently decrease risky asset investment;（3） large shareholder＇s expropriation level is positive with the safe asset allocation proportion but negative with the risky asset allocation;（4） large shareholders＇ expropriation level is negative with the firm valuation,it can decrease the large shareholder＇s expropriation level from increasing the cash flow rights,hence to increase the firm valuation.