摘要
由于产品差异化、证明标准、可预见性规则、争议处理的成本等方面的限制,损害赔偿通常是补偿不足的,造成违约人将部分违约成本外部化,导致了过多的违约,这暗示应该常规地适用实际履行。效率违约理论挑战这个观点,认为实际履行阻碍了资源流向最有价值的用途,或者增加了交易成本。经济分析表明,效率违约理论本身是经不起检验的。而且,由于实际履行与减损规则相互冲突,当守约人能通过市场完成补救时,应限制实际履行。
Limitations on cost suit in inadequate compensation for for product differentiation, standard of proof, predictability rules often redamages , which leads to externalization of part of the breach and arouses more defaults. It implies that the specific performance should be applied normally, but such view meets chal- lenge from the theory of efficient breach, which claims that the specific performance prevents resources from flowing to the most valuable use and increases transaction cost. Whereas, economic analysis indicates that the efficient breach cannot stand the test. Moreover, since the specific performance conflicts with the mitigation rule, where the innocent party can get remedies through the market, the specific performance should be restrained.
出处
《北方法学》
2010年第6期110-119,共10页
Northern Legal Science
基金
国家社科基金项目"正确处理‘小产权房’与农村地制创新"(项目编号08BJY055)的研究成果
关键词
补偿不足
实际履行
效率违约
减损规则
inadequate compensation
the specific performance
efficient breach
the mitigation rule