摘要
采用历史研究和博弈论相结合的方法对美国萨班斯法案的负面经济后果进行解读后发现,萨班斯法案的负面经济后果并不意味着萨班斯法案的失败,民间审计不是一项公共产品,其本质仍是一种私立秩序,政府和法律主要作用在于对其缺陷的弥补,而不应是过多替代。萨班斯法案负面经济后果产生的表面原因是具体监管方法的问题,而其产生的深层原因是民间审计的私序本质,其诱因则是过度的"压力和诱惑"。因此,解决不良经济后果的措施除了进一步改进具体监管方法,还需要在监管中让私序和公共制度更加和谐共生,并进一步减轻不必要的"压力和诱惑"。
The author combined the history study with the game theory to research the economic consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.The negative economic consequences does not mean the failure of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,but reminds people: civil audit is not a public product,but a private order.The primary role of the government and law is not to substitute the private order too much,but to make up for its defects.The problems of specific monitoring methods are the surface causes of the negative economic consequences.The private order nature of civil audit is the underlying cause.The pressures and temptations are the incentive.Therefore,much has to be done to further improve specific monitoring methods,avoiding adverse economic consequences is also needed to harmonize the public and private order and to reduce the unnecessary pressures and temptations.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期23-30,共8页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70872020)
福建省教育厅基金项目(JA09032S)
关键词
民间审计
博弈均衡
萨班斯法案
经济后果
civil audit
game equilibrium
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
economic consequences