中国转型期地方政府行为取向及调控策略研究

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' BEHAVIOR PATTERNS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL STRATEGY DURING TRANSITION

本文基于多任务委托—代理的视角分析了中国转型时期的地方政府行为取向及其调控策略。地方政府既可以付出与中央政府利益一致的合作性努力,也可以付出与中央政府利益不一致的自私性努力,合作性努力水平和自私性努力水平取决于既定体制下的激励机制。在制度安排既定的情况下,中央政府既可以通过采取适当的补偿措施来提高地方政府的合作性努力水平,也可以通过适当的惩罚措施来降低地方政府的自私性努力水平,这其中有规律可循。

This paper focuses mainly on China＇s local governments＇ behavior patterns and the central government＇s control strategy from the perspective of multi-task principal-agent theory. Local governments not only exert cooperative efforts in line with the central government, but also exert selfish efforts not in line with the interests of the central government. The levels of cooperative and selfish efforts are indigenously determined by the incentive mechanism in a given political and economic system. The central government can both take appropriate compensation measures to raise the level of local governments＇ cooperative efforts, and take appropriate punishment measures to reduce the level of their selfish efforts.