摘要
煤电关系的实质是一种以合作为目标的谈判博弈关系,因而煤电冲突的解决也应以合作为前提。我国煤炭企业和发电企业之间谈判的空间取决于双方各自的价格底限,而交易价格的最终达成取决于双方谈判势力的相对大小。电煤市场的供求状况会改变双方的价格底线,但对谈判空间没有实质性影响。我国煤电冲突的根源并不在于电煤市场的短缺,而是煤电双方基于市场势力和政府背景两方面获得的谈判势力,减少政府对煤电关系的不合理干预是解决煤电冲突的可行之路。
Since the relationship between coal and electricity enterprises is in nature a bargaining game aimed at cooperation, the solution to their conflicts should be based on cooperation as well. The bargaining range between the two parties is subject to their respective bottom prices. The actual price is determined by the difference in their bargaining power. The demand and supply of the coal and electricity markets could affect their respective bottom prices, but has no real effect on the bargaining range. The root of the conflicts between coal and electricity enterprises in China is not the shortage of coal, but the different bargaining power of the two parties stemming from their respective market power and relationship with governments. Reduction of unnecessary government intervention would be one of the advisable ways to settle the conflict.
出处
《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期107-112,共6页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
山东大学自主创新基金项目“公共物品视角下的中国竞争政策效应研究”(项目编号IFW09001)的阶段性成果
关键词
煤电关系
纳什谈判
谈判势力
relationship between coal and electricity enterprises
Nash bargaining
bargaining power