利益集团视角下国有银行不良资产处置的拖延与突破

Delay and Breakthrough on Treatment of the Non-performing Assets of State-owned Banks in a Perspective of Interest Groups

在特定历史背景和体制约束下,本文从利益集团的视角来探求经济危机加快国有银行不良资产处置的一般机理。研究表明:利益集团对"公地"性质的国有银行信贷资金的寻租与不合作是改革拖延的原因,而经济危机和银行体制转换压力促使国有银行不良资产处置的突破;利益集团之间议价能力的悬殊影响拖延的长短,只有制衡和协调利益集团才能加快国有银行针对不良资产的体制改革。

Under the specific historical background and institutional constraints, this article discusses the mechanism that the fi- nancial crisis can speed up the treatment on non-performing assets （NPA） of state-owned banks （SOB） in a perspective of inter- est groups. The study shows that the interest groups chase rent-seeking and defect on the credit funds of SOB that can explain the delay, the reform breakthrough is actuated by the economic crisis and the banking system transformation pressure; the disparity of bargaining ability between the interest groups affect length of delay, only to balance and cooperate between the interest groups, can we accelerate the reform on SOB of NPA.