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利用收益矩阵完善政府监督制度

On the Improving the Government's Supervisory System by Using the Pay-off Matrix
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摘要 通过建立博弈论模型分析了官员交易与监管者根据自己利益所采取的不同策略。在监管者与官员博弈中,存在完全信息下的纳什均衡或混合纳什均衡。为了遏制买卖官职现象,本文建议政府应该通过增加官员交易的成本,缩小官员之间的收入差距,做到官员提拔制度化、官员监督独立化,建立有效的激励机制来完善现行的监督制度。 Recently buying and selling the government official posts is quite rampant,and big cases were taking place frequently.By establishing the game-theory model,this article analyzed the official business and the different tactics which supervisors took in terms of their own benefits.In the game between supervisors and officers,there is the Nash equilibrium or Mixed Nash equilibrium in the complete information condition.For restraining the trade of government posts,this paper suggests that the government should increase the cost of official business and reduce the income gap between the officials.It will be helpful for improving the present supervisory system to systematize the official promotion,make the official supervision independent,and establish the effective stimulating mechanism.
作者 李京华
出处 《晋城职业技术学院学报》 2010年第6期50-52,72,共4页 Journal of Jincheng Institute of Technology
关键词 收益矩阵 博弈 买官 卖官 监管者 pay-off matrix game buying and selling the official posts the supervisor
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