摘要
本文以2004-2008年连续披露R＆D支出的制造业和高新技术业上市公司的样本数据,采用Hansen提出的门槛效应模型,实证检验董事会规模与企业R＆D投资行为之间的关系。当以公司规模为门槛变量时研究发现,只有当公司规模超过某一临界值之后,董事会规模才与企业R＆D行为之间表现为一种＂先增后减＂的非线性关系,并由此得出董事会规模的公司治理效应可能存在类似于宏观经济学中的＂低水平陷阱＂现象;而以董事会规模为门槛变量时发现,最佳的董事会规模应为7人或者9人。研究还发现,董事会中独立董事所占比例的增加对改善企业的R＆D投资决策未起到明显效果,独立董事＂花瓶＂现象仍普遍存在。
Base on panel data of manufacturing and high-tech industry companies who discourse R＆D expenditure in financial statements from 2004 to 2008, this paper studies the relationship between board sizes and R＆D expending behavior by using the threshold model that Hansen proposed in 1999. When the threshold variable is company size, the results show that only when the company sizes exceeds a critical value, there will be a ＂increasing first, decreasing later＂ non-linear relationship between board sizes and corporate R＆D expenditure. So we deduce that corporate governance effects of board sizes present the ＂low level trap＂ phenomenon. When the threshold variable is board sizes, the study suggests that the best board size should be 7 or 9. The results also show that percentage of independent directors on the Board play no effects to improve corporate R＆D investment decisions.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期32-37,共6页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目09XJC630015)
