大股东、少数股东联盟与公司债务期限选择——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据

Large shareholders,shareholder alliance and corporate debt maturity:empirical study under the framework of principle-agent theory

以委托代理理论为基础,考虑了实际控制人的股权性质以及公司个体之间的差异,选取我国制造业上市公司为研究样本,建立个体固定效应模型,实证检验了股权结构与债务期限结构之间的关系。结果表明:第一大股东持股比例与债务期限结构正相关;股权集中度与债务期限结构正相关;少数股东持股集中度与债务期限结构正相关;实际控制人的性质为国有产权的公司更加偏好短期债务融资。

Based on principle-agent theory between the shareholders and managers,this essay take the data of the China＇s manufacturing listed corporate as sample to test empirically the relationship between large shareholders,nature of the actual controller,ownership concentration and debt maturity structure.Findings show that,the corporate of the largest shareholders with high proportion holdings uses short-term debt constraints.The state-owned corporate prefer to use short-term debt to solve the principle-agent problem between the shareholders and managers.Increased ownership concentration decreases the motivation to use short-term debt constraints.