从与胡塞尔的先验现象学比较的角度解读海德格尔的《存有与时间》

Approach to Heidegger’s Being and Time from the Comparative Perspective with Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

海德格尔的《存有与时间》是对胡塞尔的先验现象学的继承和批判。《存有与时间》中虽然出现了很多新的哲学词汇,但熟悉胡塞尔的学者会发现它们在胡塞尔那里有相对应的用语,如:"此在"(Dasein)与"先验自我"(transzendentale Ego),"此在的结构"与"意向性的结构","我操劳"(sorgen)与"我思"(cogito)。在这篇文章中,我试图把这种关系揭示出来,以便读者能更好地理解海德格尔的《存有与时间》的思想脉络。

Heidegger’s Being and Time is both inheritation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Although there are many new philosophical terms in Being and Time, scholars who are familiar with those two philosophers can find that corresponding expressions in Husserl’s works, such as 'Dasein' and 'transcendental Ego', 'the structure of Dasein' and 'the structure of intentionality', 'I care' (sorgen) and 'I think' (cogito). In this article I attempt to uncover this relationship so that readers can better understand the thread of thought of Heidegger’s Being and Time.