摘要
建国后,中央与地方关系一直处于动态调整和不断变化之中。改革开放通过机制变迁解决了地方政府发展经济的激励问题,为"中国模式"和"中国道路"的生成提供了坚强的制度支撑,但同时也强化了地方政府的机会主义行为倾向,为中央调控增加了困难。"一放就乱、一收就死"模式不再能全面概括中央地方关系的新景象,简单收权也很难有效规避地方行为,地方治理失控成为全社会高度关注的难题。中央政府必须从顶层重新审视和设计中央地方关系,通过优化地方治理结构来调节地方政府行为。
Since 1949,the relationship between central and local government in China has been changing.The reform and Open policies have stimulated local governments to increase economical growth,but on the other hand,local official have obvious ＂ opportunism＂ tendency to act,which means that local governments want to achieve great economical performance in short term.The central government should rethink the relationship and institution wholly and control local behavior through optimization of the local governance structure.
出处
《上海行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期13-20,共8页
The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute
基金
国家社会科学基金项目<综合配套改革中服务型政府的构建:浦东个案的研究>
项目批准号09BZZ033
关键词
治理结构
中央地方关系
制度
Governance Structure
Central-Local Relationship
Institute
