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产业基金促进资本积累的机制——基于信贷配给视角的分析 被引量:4

The Mechanism for Industry Funds to Accelerate Capital Accumulation——An Analysis from Credit Rationing Perspective
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摘要 在信息不对称条件下,信贷配给可以作为一个长期均衡状态存在。通过引入产业基金可以缓解信贷配给,促进资本积累。企业家根据不同的情况来决定是否引入产业基金。如果拥有良好回报的投资项目,那么引入产业基金就具有吸引力。在众多产业投资基金竞争条件下,企业家将面临一个具有优厚条件的离职期权,但同时产业基金也会通过提供一个合理的分红比例吸引企业家继续经营直至项目完成。同时,信贷资金获取成本的存在使得引入产业投资基金仍然是一个非严格优的选择。 This paper discusses how industry funds promote capital accumulation from credit rationing perspective. It is shown that credit rationing can exist as a long-term equilibrium due to information asymmetry. Therefore, the introduction of industry fund can alleviate information asymmetry and accelerate capital accumulation. Entrepreneurs can decide whether to introduce industry fund according to different situations. If the project is good, the introduction of industry fund is attractive. Under the competition of numerous industry funds, entrepreneurs face a turnover option including generous income, and by supplying a proper proportion of dividend, industry fund can attract entrepreneurs to go on managing the project until it is completed. At the same time, the introduction of industry fund is non-strict optimal choice due to cost of obtaining credits.
作者 于波
出处 《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》 CAS 2010年第11期35-39,共5页 Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
关键词 产业基金 资本积累 信贷配给 industry fund capital accumulation credit rationing
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参考文献12

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