信息披露、代理成本与公司治理

Information Disclosure,Agency Cost and Corporate Governance

本文采用2004-2008年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,运用面板数据固定效应模型和Logistic回归模型,分项和综合考察了公司治理对信息披露质量和代理成本的影响。结果显示:信息披露质量与股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例、高管持股比例、公司控制权、公司所有权显著正相关,与股东人数显著负相关,与最终控制人属性无显著关联;代理成本与股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例、高管持股比例、公司控制权、所有权显著负相关,与股东人数、最终控制人属性无显著关联。

Based the data of the listed non - financial and non - ST Chinese companies from 2004 to 2008, this paper analyzes how corporate governance influences information disclosure quality and agency costs by employing panel data fixed effects model and Logistic regression model. Results show that disclosure quality have a positive influence on equity concentration, share ratio of the largest shareholder, executive shareholding, control rights, corporate ownership, and a negative influence on shareholders, but no influence on the property of ultimate controller. The agency cost has a negative influence on equity concentration, stock shares of the largest shareholder, executive shareholding, control rights, corporate ownership, and no influence on the number of shareholders, the property of ultimate controller.