分析师跟踪、产权安排与公司避税行为——来自新企业所得税法实施后的经验证据

Analyst Following,Property Rights Arrangement and Corporate Tax Avoidance—— Evidence from the Implementation of New Enterprise Income Tax Law

根据Scholes和Wolfson(1992)的现代公司避税行为理论框架以及信息经济学理论,运用2008年新企业所得税法实施后的经验数据,研究了分析师跟踪、产权安排与企业避税行为之间的关系。结果表明,分析师跟踪人数较多、信息不对称程度较低的企业隐性避税成本较低,会选择更为激进的避税行为,实际税率更低,节税水平更高,并且这一效应主要存在于民营企业中。

The theoretical framework of modern corporate tax avoidance was constructed by Scholes and Wolfson（1992）,saying that tax avoidance decision is a trade-off between tax savings benefits and cost of tax avoidance.Using the data after the implementation of new enterprise income tax law in 2008,the author explores the relationship between analyst following,property arrangements and corporate tax avoidance activities.The empirical results show that more analysts following leads to less information asymmetry and companies choose the more aggressive tax avoidance;Property arrangements will also affect these relationships,such effect mainly exists in private firms.This research provids empirical evidence for future researchers in this area and indirect reference for our tax supervision department.