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国资委统一委托审计:理论基础与改进措施 被引量:2

SASAC Unified Appointment of CPA Audit:a Theory and the Improvement
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摘要 本文在对审计委托权及其配置进行研究的基础上,针对国有资产监督管理委员会(以下简称国资委)试行统一委托审计的实践,分析了其经验、问题和对策。本文的结论是:国资委对国有独资公司应直接统一委托,对国有控股公司,应由控股股东提名,经董事会、股东大会批准。签约时,对国有独资公司,应由国资委与会计师事务所签约;对国有控股公司,应经国资委审批后由企业与会计师事务所签约。审计费用应由国资委代收代支。 The article studies the audit appointment rights and its arrangement. And according to the practice of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) unified appointment, analyzes its experience, limitation and countermeasures. The conclusion is. for the wholly state-owned company, it should be unified appointment directlyr for the state-controlled company, the Accounting Firm should be nominated by holding stockholders, and authorized by directors' board and general meeting of stockholders; in signing, for the wholly state-owned company, the audit engagement letter should be signed by SASAC; for the state-controlled company, the audit engagement letter should be examined and approved by SASAC before being signed: the audit fee should be receiving on another's behalf paying on another's behalf.
作者 白华 赵迎春
出处 《审计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第6期100-104,共5页 Auditing Research
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:06BGJ014) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:07JA630081) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:08JA630030)资助
关键词 审计委托权 统一委托 会计师事务所 audit appointment rights, unified appointment, accounting firm
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共引文献685

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