旅游业小费制的经济学分析

Economic Analysis on the Tip System of the Tourism Industry

旅游业是否应该实行小费制度在我国是一个长期争论而没有结论的问题。本文应用信息经济学基础理论,构建委托人—代理人效用模型,分析在不完全信息结构下,对不同类型的服务业,什么样的交易制度有助于遏制"道德风险"问题,促进市场效率。一个基本的结论是:高职业投入成本的行业,声誉和职业认证制度就足以起到激励相容的效果,采取消费前付费的交易制度有足够效率;在低投入成本的服务类型中,小费制度就是使得委托人、代理人利益相一致的激励相容机制。这就解释了在旅游业中为什么小费制度是一种国际通行的有效市场制度。

The tourism industry should implement tip system in china is a long debate with no conclusion. This paper builds a principalagent utility model, and analyzes what kind of trading system can avoid ＂moral hazard＂ and promote market efficiency to different types of services industry in the incomplete information structure. We can conclude that the industry of high cost of professional input can take trading system of pre-paid consumption because of the reputation and professional certification system, and the industry of low cost of professional input should take the tip system which is a system of incentive compatibility of the principal and agent. This explains why the tip system in tourism industry is an internationally accepted and effective market system.