反垄断执法与经济周期:相机选择还是固定规则——以美国为例

Antitrust Enforcement and Business Cycles: Contingent Play or Hard-and-Fast Rule——Take U.S. as an Example

本文选取了美国1963~2009年反垄断执法的数据,对影响反垄断执法的因素进行了实证分析,试图揭示反垄断执法与经济周期之间的关系。实证结果表明反垄断执法是反经济周期的,即经济收缩时,反垄断执法增强;而经济扩张时,反垄断执法反而减弱。结果还表明反垄断机构的财政拨款对反垄断执法有着很强的正影响;而并购浪潮和反垄断政策内在的体制变迁对反垄断执法却有着负效应。

Using the data about U.S.antitrust enforcement from 1963 to 2009,this paper makes an empirical analysis of determents of antitrust enforcement,attempting to find the relationship between antitrust enforcement and business cycles.The key finding is that antitrust enforcement is countercyclical.That is to say,antitrust enforcement strengthens during economic downturns;and it weakens during economic expands.The results also show that antitrust agents＇ financial appropriations has a significantly positive impact on antitrust enforcement,and,however,merger waves and regime shift in antitrust policy have negitive effect on antitrust enforcement.