不对称信息下政府的低效倾向及对策分析

The Inevitable Inefficient Tendency of Government Under Asymmetric Information and Countermeasures Analysis

本文以政府提供公共产品的供求模型作为基础,结合委托代理理论,分析部门预算的收支,得出以下结论:不对称信息下的政府部门具有人员机构膨胀、公共产品提供不足或低质等低效率的必然结果倾向;公开部门预算,实现政府部门预算透明化,是减少不对称信息的最有效手段;可采取相应配套改革措施,提高政府部门财政资金的使用效率。

This essay makes the model of government providing public products as the foundation, combining the agency by agreement theory, analysing the department budget expenditure,and obtaines that under asymmetric information of govermnent departments, public institutions have the inevitable tendency of inadequate or low quality products. The essay combines with the reality , thinks that opening public department budget is the most effective means. At the same time, it puts forward corresponding measures to guarantee the reform, improving the financial efficiency of the government departments.