摘要
本文基于有限理性和信息不对称的框架,通过引入进化博弈模型,建立了一个存在并购破裂风险的无限期企业并购定价模型,并以并购方为例,对影响并购谈判的主要因素及应采取的策略进行分析。模型表明,并购方策略稳定性主要受被并购方对谈判破裂风险的态度影响,并与其报价以及真实价值紧密相关。因此,并购方可以采用先试探后改变出价的谈判方式,试探出被并购方的真实价值,进而操纵被并购方策略调整速度,以维护自身利益。
This paper,based on the framework of bounded rationality and asymmetric information,introduces the evolutionary game theory and then creates an enterprises＇MA pricing model featured by risk of breakdown and of indefinite duration.Then it exemplifies an acquirer to analyze the main factors that affect MA negotiation and strategies.The newly developed model shows that stability of an acquirer＇s strategies largely depends on the attitude of the target enterprise towards the risk of negotiation breakdown and is closely related to the target enterprise＇s price requirement and its real value.Therefore,the acquirer in the process of MA negotiation could adopt approaches of price adjustment after trial offers to feel out the real value of the target enterprise and control the speed of the target＇s strategic adjustment to safeguard its own interests in the negotiations.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第11期21-29,共9页
Management Review
基金
国家社科基金项目(10BGL010)
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(09YJA630064)
关键词
有限理性
信息不对称
破裂风险
进化博弈论
bounded rationality
asymmetric information
risk of breakdown
evolutionary game theory
