大股东利益侵占与管理层激励的实证分析

Empirical Analysis on Large Shareholder Encroachment and Management Incentive

以我国A股上市公司2005年的数据为样本,检验了控股大股东的利益侵占行为对公司管理层激励强度的影响作用。实证检验结果显示:大股东对上市公司的资金占用程度越高,公司管理者的持股比例越低;但是大股东对上市公司资金占用程度没有对管理者的薪酬水平产生显著的影响。

On the base of Sample data from China A-share listed company in 2005,the paper verifies the influence of controlling shareholder encroachment on management incentive.The result of empirical analysis demonstrates that the more capital the large shareholders occupy,the less share proportion the company executives have.However,the capital occupying of major shareholders has no distinctive impact on executive pay.