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股权结构、管理层权力与多元化经营——基于中国上市公司的实证研究 被引量:2

Ownership Structure,Managerial Power and Diversified Management——Based on Empirical Study of Listed Companies in China
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摘要 股权结构与多元化的关系研究是近年来公司治理领域研究的重点和热点问题之一。通过构建股权结构、管理层权力和企业多元化的动态作用机制的理论框架,以筛选出的531家中国上市公司为研究对象,进行了实证分析。发现股权结构,包括第一大股东持股比例与企业多元化呈显著U型曲线关系;管理者持股与企业的多元化正相关,管理层权力型企业比非管理层权力型企业的企业多元化倾向更大。 By building the theoretical framework of the dynamic role mechanism of ownership structure,managerial power and enterprise diversification,this paper regards the chosen 531 listed Chinese companies as the research objects and conducts empirical analysis.It finds that there is a strong U-curve relation between the enterprise diversification and ownership concentration,including the proportion of the first block share holdings,there is positively correlation between the proportion of manager shares and diversification.Diversification is greater tendency in companies with great managerial power as compared with other companies.
作者 周丹 杨晓玉
出处 《长春理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2010年第5期45-48,共4页 Journal of Changchun University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(11544006)
关键词 股权结构 管理层权力 多元化 ownership structure managerial power enterprise diversification
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献41

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