企业非效率投资行为的治理

The Governance of Corporate Inefficiency Investment Behavior

由于信息不对称、委托代理冲突以及不完全契约等因素客观存在,导致了企业一些投资行为并不是从投资人利益最大化角度出发,而是满足了企业管理者(或实际控制人)的私人收益,从而产生了非效率投资行为。基于此,文章从股权集中度、市场流动性、董事会机制、管理层激励、会计信息透明度以及企业制度环境等方面对企业非效率投资行为的治理进行了分析,对改善企业投资效率具有理论指导意义。

Because of information asymmetry, principal some investment behavior of enterprise can not meet the -agent conflicts, and incomplete contract lead that benefits of investors to maximize, but rather meet the firm manager （or actual controller） private profit, and result in some inefficient investment behavior of enterprises. On this basis, to improve the efficiency of the enterprise investment, this article analyzed the governance of enterprise inefficient investment behavior from the ownership concentration, market liquidity, the Board of Directors, the management incentives, accounting information transparency, and institutional environment.