期刊文献+

供应链融资模式下第三方物流消解信息不对称研究 被引量:7

Research on Third-party Logistics' Dilution Effect on Asymmetric Information in Supply Chain Financing Mode
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摘要 第三方物流作为供应链融资中控制风险的关键要素较好地解决了银企间的信息不对称问题。首先,第三方物流凭借专业技能对动产进行监管,使之成为银行愿意接受的抵押品;其次,第三方物流作为银行的代理人,为银行提供更多的有关中小企业的信息;再次,第三方物流为中小企业提供信用担保,中小企业以动产进行反担保,这三条措施减轻了银企间的信息不对称。本文在理论分析的基础上通过数理模型证明第三方物流在消解信息不对称方面发挥的重要作用,并提出相关政策建议。 Third-party logistics resolves asymmetric information between banks and SMEs preferable.Firstly,third-party logistics supervises chattel property according to their professional skills and makes sure that chattel property become bank acceptable mortgage.Secondly,third-party logistics provides more information about SMEs as banks' agent.Thirdly,third-party logistics supplies credit guarantee for SMEs,and SMEs counter guarantee by chattel property.These three methods reduce asymmetric information between banks and SMEs.This paper uses mathematical model to prove that third-party logistics has important functions in diluting asymmetric information,and provides relevant suggestions.
出处 《金融发展研究》 2010年第11期13-16,共4页 Journal Of Financial Development Research
关键词 供应链融资 第三方物流 信息不对称 双层委托—代理关系 supply chain financing third-party logistics asymmetric information double principal-agent relationship
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