摘要
在土地租佃契约理论中,有个长期的传统,即认为固定租金契约比分成制在资源配置方面要来得好。既然如此,分成制为什么会作为一个普遍的制度性安排而长期存在呢?对不完全信息下的土地契约理论进行规范的经济学分析后发现:(1)分成制会导致效率损失;(2)分成制是一种次优均衡。当考虑风险与激励的因素时,地主和佃农都将偏好在分成制契约下进行生产。
There is a tradition in the theory of land tenancy contracts that fixed-rent tenancy is better than sharecropping in resource allocation.But in reality,sharecropping has been existing as an institutional arrangement.This paper analyzes the theory of land tenancy contracts normatively under the condition of incomplete information.The results indicate that sharecropping will cause efficiency loss and lead to a second best equilibrium.However,if risks and incentives are considered,both landlords and tenants will prefer sharecropping.
出处
《华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期79-84,共6页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
基金
上海市科技发展基金软研究项目(10692102700)
关键词
土地经济
固定租金
分成制
风险分担与激励
land economics
fixed-rent
sharecropping
risk sharing and incentives