委托—代理治理模式的适用性及其问题

The Applicability of Principal-agent Governance and Its Limitations

现代主流经济学往往把委托—代理关系视为一种普遍的社会存在,把委托—代理治理视为社会经济关系的基本治理机制,它要求:设计合理的合同激励经理或员工为股东利益服务,并以法律手段给予股东恰当的权利,赋予董事会监管经理的信托责任。但是,这种治理模式在实际应用中却会遇到很大的局限:1.在现实中纯粹的委托人和代理人往往是找不到的;2.委托—代理单向治理的效果取决于监督权的完善程度和法理基础;3.委托—代理机制隐含着"委托人会自动履行其承诺"的前提是不现实的;4.委托—代理治理机制在实践中应用也不像理论阐述的那样普遍。特别地,委托—代理治理机制在理论思维上也存在重大缺陷:它将两个行为主体割裂开来,而没有考虑到双方的整体性,忽视了作为协作系统构成要素地位的平等性,从而无法真正地增进企业组织的有效性。

Modern mainstream economics usually takes the relation of principal and agent as a widespread social existence and regards the governance as a basic mechanism.The governance of principal-agent requests to design rational contract to encourage manager or employees to serve for shareholder＇s benefits,awards shareholder fitting right by law,and gives the board of directors the trust responsibility to take charge of a manager.However,this kind of governance meets great limitation in application.（1）The sheer principal and agent usually can not be found in the reality.（2）The effect of governance based on principal-agent is decided on the strength and the legal foundation of supervision.（3）The premise ＂principal will implement its commitment automatically＂ hided in the governance of principal-agent is not realistic.（4）The application of the theory of principal-agent is not ubiquitous just like the allegation theoretically.Especially,there is serious drawback on theoretical thought for the mechanism of principal-agent：it separates the two behaviors and ignores the whole and equal;as a result,it can not promote the validity of firm.