双渠道供应链中制造商与零售商的服务合作定价策略

Service cooperation pricing strategy between manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chain

在双渠道供应链中,为缓解渠道冲突,提高服务效率,制造商选择将电子渠道的服务交由零售商完成.在对称信息的框架下,建立了双渠道供应链中制造商电子渠道与零售商服务合作的Stackelberg和Bertrand博弈模型.发现渠道价格和需求受制造商在电子渠道的边际服务成本和零售商在电子渠道的边际服务成本影响;制造商在电子渠道的服务成本与零售渠道的定价正相关.当零售渠道服务水平高于电子渠道服务水平时,零售商的服务成本与电子渠道的定价正相关.Stackelberg竞争下制造商电子渠道和零售渠道价格均小于Bertrand竞争情形.制造商总是偏好作价格的领导者.利用算例分析了市场批发价格、渠道服务水平等对零售商选择Stackelberg竞争或Bertrand竞争偏好的影响.

In dual-channel supply chain, in order to avoid channel conflict and improve service efficiency, manufacturers outsource electronic channels＇ service to retailers. In the symmetric-information frame- work, the service-cooperation Stackelberg and Bertrand models between electronic channels and retailers in dual-channel supply chain are proposed. It shows that manufacturers and retailers＇ marginal service cost in electronic channels have great effect on the channels＇ demand and pricing decision. Manufacturers＇ service cost in electronic channels is positively associated with the retails channels＇ pricing. If the service quality of retail channels is higher than that of electronic channels, the service cost of retail channels is positively associated with the electronic channels＇ price. The price of both channels under Stackelberg com- petition is lower than that of Bertrand competition. Manufacturers always prefer the leadership of pricing. By numerical examples, retailers＇ choosing between Stackelberg competition and Bertrand competition is discussed, which is affected by the wholesale price and channels＇ service level.