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论机制设计理论与腐败风险防控的关系 被引量:3

On the Relations Between Mechanism Design Theory and Corrupt Risk Prevention and Control
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摘要 机制设计理论是研究在自由选择、自愿交换、信息不完全及决策分散化的条件下,能否设计一套机制(规则或制度)来达到既定目标的理论。设计一套好的机制需要满足三个条件:帕累托改进、信息效率、激励相容,而现实中同时满足的情况较为少见,如果满足了上述两个以上的条件,都可以视之为好的机制。论述了帕累托改进与腐败风险防控的关系;信息效率与腐败风险防控的关系;激励相容与腐败风险防控的关系。 The mechanism design theory is a theory whether to design a set of mechanisms(rule or system) to achieve the given objective under the condition of the free choice,the voluntary exchange,incomplete information and decentralized policy-making.To design a set of good mechanism,it needs to satisfy three conditions: Pareto improves,the information efficiency,incentive compatibility.While in the reality simultaneously meeting the situation was rarer,if the above two conditions were satisfied,it can be regarded as good mechanism.The paper discussed the relations between Pareto improves and corrupt risk prevention and control,the information efficiency and corrupt risk prevention and control,incentive compatibility and corrupt risk prevention and control.
作者 袁柏顺 黄澌
出处 《福建行政学院学报》 2010年第6期62-66,共5页 Journal of Fujian Administration Institute
关键词 机制设计理论 腐败 风险防控 Mechanism design theory Corrupt The risk prevention and control.
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